For more than a decade, it was believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) is impossible. But basing on a previously proposed quantum key distribution scheme using orthogonal states, here we build a QBC protocol in which the density matrices of the quantum states encoding the commitment do not satisfy a crucial condition on which the no-go proofs of QBC are based. Thus the no-go proofs could be evaded. Our protocol is fault-tolerant and very feasible with currently available technology. It reopens the venue for other "post-cold-war" multi-party cryptographic protocols, e.g., quantum bit string commitment and quantum strong coin tossing with an arbitrarily small bias. This result also has a strong influence on the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson theorem which suggests that quantum theory could be characterized in terms of information-theoretic constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum bit commitment (QBC) is an essential primitive for quantum cryptography. It is the building block for quantum multi-party secure computations and more complicated "post-cold-war era" multi-party cryptographic protocols [1, 2] . The first QBC protocol was proposed along with the very first proposal for quantum key distribution (QKD), i.e., the Bennett-Brassard (BB) 84 protocol [3] . But it was pointed out at the same time that the protocol is insecure against coherent attacks. An improved one was proposed later, known as the Brassard-Crépeau-Jozsa-Langlois (BCJL) 93 protocol [4] . It was accepted as secure for a while until a cheating strategy was found in 1996 [5] . Shortly after, it was further concluded that any QBC protocol cannot be unconditionally secure in principle [6] [7] [8] . This result was called the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem. It was considered as putting a serious drawback on quantum cryptography. Though the result is widely accepted nowadays, there is also doubt on the generality of the theoretical model of QBC used in the no-go proof, as it seems unconvincing that limited mathematical formulation can characterize all possible protocols [9] . New protocols attempting to evade the no-go theorem were proposed every now and then [10] - [28] , though most of them turned out to be unsuccessful [29, 30] or at least failed to gain a wide recognition. Nevertheless, these attempts stimulated the research on proving the no-go theorem in more rigorous forms. Refs. [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] reviewed the original no-go proof with fuller explanations, with some simple examples of insecure protocols given in [31, 35] . Ref. [33] also extended the proof to cover ideal quantum coin tossing. More complicated examples on how to apply the no-go proof to break some quantum as well as classical bit commitment (BC) protocols which * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn looked promising at that time were provided in [36] and [37] , respectively. Refs. [38] [39] [40] further studied the security bounds of QBC quantitatively, with [39] focused on the protocol in [3] . Refs. [41, 42] worked on a similar direction, while focused especially on the class of protocols in [10] - [14] . Later on, a very detailed proof was presented both in the Heisenberg picture [43] and the Schrödinger picture [44] , with the intention to achieve a more rigorous bound on the concealment-bindingness tradeoff that can apply to all conceivable QBC protocols in which both classical and quantum information are exchanged, including [10, [18] [19] [20] 22] . It was also shown that the no-go theorem remains valid in a world subject to superselection rules [45] [46] [47] , or for QBC associated with secret parameters [48, 49] , or when the participants are restricted to use Gaussian states and operations only [50] . Recent efforts also include [51, 52] , which proved the no-go theorem with alternative methods.
As the no-go theorem became well-accepted, people started to discuss the possibility of building BC under various security conditions, e.g., classical BC under relativistic settings [53, 54] or tamper-evident seals [55] , quantum relativistic BC [56, 57] , computationally secure QBC [58] [59] [60] [61] . There are also QBC under experimental limitations, such as individual measurements [62, 63] or limited coherent measurements [64] , misaligned reference frames [65] , limited or noisy quantum storage [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] , unstability of particles [72, 73] , Gaussian operations with non-Gaussian states [74] , etc. [75] [76] [77] [78] . Some even considered BC in post-quantum theories [79] - [82] . Others proposed less secure QBC [83, 84] , variations of the definition of QBC, e.g., cheat-sensitive QBC [85] [86] [87] [88] , conditionally secure QBC [89] , etc. [90] [91] [92] [93] .
In this paper we still focus on the original QBC without these conditions. Basing on an existing QKD scheme using orthogonal states [94, 95] , we show that it becomes possible to build a QBC protocol, to which the no-go proofs do not apply. This protocol enables many other cryptographies, and is readily implementable with currently available technology. We also address the relation-ship between this finding and the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson (CBH) theorem [96] which tries to characterize quantum theory in terms of information-theoretic constraints.
QKD provides an unconditionally secure method for two remote participants to transmit secret information against any eavesdropper. Most existing QKD schemes (e.g., [3, 97, 98] ) use nonorthogonal states as carriers for the transmitted information. Since quantum mechanics guarantees that nonorthogonal states cannot be faithfully cloned, any eavesdropping will inevitably introduce detectable disturbance on the states. Thus the eavesdropper will be caught once he gains a non-trivial amount of information. For this reason, it was once believed that nonorthogonal states are necessary for secure QKD. But Goldenberg and Vaidman managed to present a scheme based on orthogonal states [94] . This brilliant idea opens yet another path for adopting more bizarre properties of quantum mechanics for cryptography. We will use it as the base of our current work.
Generally, in both QKD and QBC the two participants are called Alice and Bob. But in our current proposal of QBC, the actions of Bob is more similar to that of the eavesdropper rather than the Bob in QKD. To avoid confusion, in this paper we use the names in the following way. In QKD, the sender of the secret information is called Alice, the receiver is renamed as Charlie instead of Bob, and the external eavesdropper is called Eve. In QBC, the sender of the commitment is Alice, the receiver is Bob, and there is no Eve since QBC merely deals with the cheating from internal dishonest participants, instead of external eavesdropping.
II. QKD SCHEME BASED ON ORTHOGONAL STATES
The QKD scheme proposed in [94] is outlined below. Consider the ideal case where no transmission error occurs in the communication channels. Alice encodes the bit values 0 and 1 she wants to transmit to Charlie, respectively, using two orthogonal states
Here |a and |b are the localized wave packets of the same qubit. When sending these states to Charlie, two details are important for the security of the scheme. First, |a and |b are not sent simultaneously, but separated by a fixed delay time τ . The value of τ should ensure that |a reached Charlie's site before |b leaves Alice's site (for simplicity, we do not study the case where τ is further reduced, even though it may not hurt the security), so that the two wave packets are never present together in the transmission channels. Second, the sending time of each |Ψ 0 and |Ψ 1 is random, and kept secret from Eve until |a already arrived. FIG. 1 illustrated the diagram for an experimental implementation of the scheme using Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Alice prepares |Ψ 0 (|Ψ 1 ) by sending a single photon from the source S 0 (S 1 ), and then splits it into |a and |b using the beam splitter BS 1 . |a is sent directly to Charlie while |b is delayed by the storage ring SR 1 before sending. At Charlie's site, |a is delayed by the storage ring SR 2 and then meets |b at the beam splitter BS 2 and interferes. The delay times caused by SR 1 and SR 2 are tuned equal. Thus the complete apparatus of Alice's and Charlie's forms a balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer, so that |Ψ 0 (|Ψ 1 ) will always make the detector D 0 (D 1 ) click when no eavesdropping occurs, allowing Charlie to decode the transmitted bit value. Alice sends Charlie a series of |Ψ 0 and |Ψ 1 , then announces all the sending times and some of the encoded bits for security check. If all announced results match with Charlie's measurement, the two parties keep the unannounced encoded bits as the secret key. It was shown that the scheme is unconditionally secure [94, 95] , since Eve can never access to the entire states |Ψ 0 and |Ψ 1 , unless she intercepts and delays |a . But then she needs to send Charlie a "dummy" state in advance to escape the detection. However, without knowing Alice's sending time beforehand, Eve can hardly send the dummy state at the proper time. Thus eavesdropping will be revealed once Alice does not send any state while Charlie's detectors click after time τ .
III. OUR QBC PROTOCOL
QBC is a two-party cryptography including two phases. In the commit phase, Alice (the sender of the commitment) decides the value of the bit b (b = 0 or 1) which she wants to commit, and sends Bob (the receiver of the commitment) a piece of evidence, e.g., some quantum states. Later, in the unveil phase, Alice announces the value of b, and Bob checks it with the evidence. An unconditionally secure QBC protocol needs to be both binding (i.e., Alice cannot change the value of b after the commit phase) and concealing (Bob cannot know b before the unveil phase) without relying on any computational assumption.
To make use of the QKD scheme in [94] for QBC, our starting point is to treat Charlie's site as a part of Alice's, so that the two parties merge into one. That is, Alice sends out a bit-string encoded with the above orthogonal states, whose value is related with the bit she wants to commit. Then she receives the states herself. Meanwhile, let Bob take the role of Eve. His action shifts between two modes. In the intercept mode, he applies the intercept-resend attack to read parts of the string. In the bypass mode, he simply does nothing so that the corresponding parts of the states return to Alice intact. Since the eavesdropping on every single bit of the string has a non-trivial probability to escape Alice's detection, at the end of the process some bits of the string become known to Bob, while Alice does not know the exact position of these bits. Thus she cannot alter the bit-string [94] . The state of a photon produced by the source S0 (S1) will become |Ψ0 = (|a + |b )/ √ 2 (|Ψ1 = (|a − |b )/ √ 2) after passing the beam splitter BS1. The wave packets |a and |b are sent through channels A and B respectively. When no eavesdropper is present, the storage rings SR1, SR2 and the mirrors M1, M2 will ensure the complete apparatus work as a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with balanced arms, so that |Ψ0 and |Ψ1 will be detected by the detectors D0 and D1, respectively.
freely at a later time, making the protocol binding. On the other hand, Bob cannot eavesdrop the whole string without being detected. Thus the value of the committed bit can be made concealing by putting a limit on the error rate Bob allowed to make in the protocol.
The rigorous description of our QBC protocol is as follows.
The commit protocol: (1) Bob chooses a binary linear (n, k, d)-code C and announces it to Alice, where n, k, d and another parameter s (s ≫ n > k > d) are agreed on by both Alice and Bob.
(2) Alice chooses a nonzero random n-bit string r = (r 1 r 2 ...r n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and announces it to Bob. This makes any n-bit codeword c = (c 1 c 2 ...c n ) in C sorted into either of the two subsets C (0) ≡ {c ∈ C|c ⊙ r = 0}
and
(3) Now Alice decides the value of the bit b that she wants to commit. Then she chooses a codeword c from C (b) randomly.
(4) Alice and Bob treat the timeline as a series of discrete time instants t 1 , t 2 , ..., t s with equal intervals. Alice encodes each bit of c as c i → |Ψ ci ≡ (|a i + (−1) ci |b i )/ √ 2 and sends them to Bob. The time t(i) for sending each |Ψ ci is randomly chosen among t 1 , t 2 , ..., t s , while all t(i)'s (i = 1, 2, ..., n) should be chosen in the sequence of i, i.e., there should be t(i 1 ) < t(i 2 ) for any i 1 < i 2 . Also, just as the QKD scheme in [94] , the two wave packets |a i and |b i of the same qubit |Ψ ci are not sent simultaneously. When we say that |Ψ ci is sent at time t(i), we mean that |a i is sent at time t(i), while |b i is delayed and then leaves Alice's site at time t(i) + τ . The delay time τ is fixed for all |Ψ ci 's and known to Bob.
(5) At each of the time instants t 1 , t 2 , ..., t s , Bob chooses the intercept mode with probability α and the bypass mode with probability 1 − α.
If he chooses to apply the intercept mode at time t j (j ∈ {1, 2, ..., s}), he prepares a qubit in the state |Ψ 0 = (|a j + |b j )/ √ 2, sends the wave packet |a j to Alice at time t j , while |b j is temporarily delayed. Meanwhile, Bob adds a delay circuit to the quantum communication channel A (where the wave packets |a i 's come from Alice). At time t j + τ , he combines the output of this delay circuit with the quantum communication channel B (where the wave packets |b i 's come from Alice), and measures whether Alice has sent him |Ψ 0 , |Ψ 1 , or nothing at all. If the result of the measurement is |Ψ 0 (|Ψ 1 ), he leaves his delayed |b j unchanged (he introduces a phase shift to change |b j into − |b j ) and sends it to Alice. In this case, Bob learned the state Alice sent at time t j while Alice cannot detect this action with certainty. But if Bob found nothing in his measurement, he measures (or simply discards) |b j . In this case, Alice's detectors will click with probability 1/2 due to the presence of |a j , revealing that Bob is running the intercept mode.
On the other hand, if Bob chooses to apply the bypass mode at time t j , he simply keeps channel A intact at time t j , and channel B intact at time t j + τ . Consequently, if a state was sent from Alice at time t j , it will be returned to her detectors as-is at time t j + τ .
(6) Alice uses the same apparatus that Bob used in the intercept mode, to measure the output of the quantum communication channels from Bob. She counts the total number of the states she received from Bob, and denotes it as n ′ . By analyzing step (5) it can be shown that n ′ ∼ α(s−n)/2+n. Thus Alice can estimate the probability of Bob choosing the intercept mode as α ∼ 2(n ′ −n)/(s−n). Alice agrees to continue with the protocol if α < 1 − d/n, which means that the number of c i 's known to Bob is αn < n − d.
(7) Alice announces all the time instants t(i)'s at which she sent |Ψ ci 's (i = 1, 2, ..., n). Bob checks that he indeed detected some states at each t(i) + τ and no detection was found at other times, as long as he has chosen the intercept mode at the corresponding time instants. This completes the commit phase. The diagram for implementing this protocol using the Mach-Zehnder interferometer is shown in FIG. 2 .
Intuitively, the protocol can achieve the goal of QBC for the following reasons. The binary linear (n, k, d)-code C can simply be viewed as a set of classical n-bit strings. Each string is called a codeword. This set of strings has two features. (A) Among all the 2 n possible choices of n-bit strings, only a particular set of the size ∼ 2 k is selected to form this set. (B) The distance (i.e., the number of different bits) between any two codewords in this set is not less than d. Feature (A) puts a limit on Alice's freedom on choosing the initial state |Ψ c ≡ |Ψ c1 ⊗ |Ψ c2 ⊗ ... ⊗ |Ψ cn . Meanwhile, feature (B) guarantees that if Alice wants to change the string c from one codeword into another, she needs to change at least d qubits of |Ψ c . But the intercept mode in the protocol enables Bob to learn about αn bits of the string c, while Alice does not know all the positions of these bits in c with certainty. Therefore, when Alice alters the codeword corresponding to |Ψ c , the probability for her to escape the detection will be only at the order of magnitude of (1 − α)
d . By increasing d, the security of the protocol against Alice's cheating will be strengthened. On the other hand, feature (A) also guarantees that the number of different codewords having less than n − d bits in common increases exponentially with k. That is, as Bob knows only αn < n−d bits of c, the potential choices for c are too much for him to determine whether c belongs to the subset C (0) or C (1) . Thus his knowledge on the committed bit b before the unveil phase can be made arbitrarily close to zero by increasing k. Fixing k/n and d/n while increasing n will then result in a protocol secure against both parties.
Note that when n → ∞ with k/n, d/n, and α fixed, the probabilities for Alice and Bob to cheat successfully in our protocol will both drop arbitrarily close to 0, but they never strictly equal to 0. As defined in [7, 99] , if a protocol can make the probability of successful cheating strictly equal to 0, then it is considered as "perfectly secure". On the other hand, when speaking of "unconditionally secure", it generally implies that the protocol should meet two requirements simultaneously. (I) Theoretically, the security of the protocol must be based directly on fundamental laws of physics (e.g., the validity of the postulates of quantum mechanics or relativity) alone rather than computational assumptions. (II) Quantitatively, the probability of successful cheating does not equal to 0, but can be made arbitrarily close to 0 by increasing some security parameters of the protocol. To emphasize the second meaning, some people use the term "information-theoretically secure" interchangeably with "unconditionally secure" [46] . So we can see that our protocol falls into this category. This is already the best we could expect from quantum cryptography so far. For example, the BCJL93 QBC protocol [4] tried to reduce the probability of successful cheating down to exactly the same level (i.e., arbitrarily close but not equal to 0), but proven failure by [5] . Ref. [38] also showed that perfectly secure QBC is impossible. The protocols proposed in it is even less secure, as at least one of the probabilities of Alice's and Bob's successful cheating can never be made arbitrarily close to 0. In fact, even the well-known BB84 QKD protocol [3] is not perfectly secure. This is because the eavesdropper Eve can always perform the most basic intercept-resend attack. That is, she intercepts any quantum state from the sender, measure it in a basis which she chooses simply by guess, then resends the resultant state to the receiver. While she stands a great chance to be detected whenever her guess is wrong, we can never neglect the probability that she can be so lucky that she guesses all the bases correctly. Even though this probability is extremely small, and drops arbitrarily close to 0 with the increase of the number of states used in the protocol, still it never strictly equal to 0. Nevertheless, QKD is still considered as the most secure communication method of today. Thus we see that an unconditionally secure protocol is already good enough.
Under practical settings, some steps of our protocol may need minor modifications. For example, the protocol can be made fault-tolerant as long as d/n is chosen to be much larger than the transmission error rate ε of the quantum channels. This is because the distance between any two codewords is not less than d. Even if a dishonest Alice replaces the channels with noiseless ones so that she can alter up to εn bits of the string c while blaming it on the transmission error, it is still insufficient to change a codeword into another one so that her committed bit b will not be altered. For this reason, in step (9) Bob can in fact allow the mismatched results between Alice's announced c i and Bob's received |Ψ ci occur with a probability not greater than ε, thus makes the protocol fully functional with noisy channels. Also, in real settings the physical systems implementing the qubits may have other degrees of freedom, which leave rooms for some technical cheating strategies. For instance, Alice may send photons with certain polarization or frequency, so that she can distinguish them from the photons Bob sends in the intercept mode. In this case, Bob and Alice should discuss at the beginning of the protocol, to limit these degrees of freedom to a single mode. In step (5) √ 2 using the source S0, and sends the wave packet |a to Alice while delaying |b . At time tj + τ , he measures the state from Alice. If the detector D0 clicks, he sends the delayed wave packet |b to Alice directly. Else if the detector D1 clicks, he changes |b to − |b using the phase shifter PS before sending. If none of D0 and D1 clicks, he discards |b . On the other hand, if Bob chooses the bypass mode at time tj, he simply removes any device in his box and let channel A (channel B) pass through to Alice intact at time tj (at time tj + τ ).
stead of performing the measurement in the original step (5) . Then if Alice wants to send distinguishable photons with a high probability so that they are sufficient for her cheating, she will inevitably be detected. Another example is given in the appendix showing how to deal with the counterfactual attack.
IV. SECURITY
Since the number of potential cheating strategies could be infinite, in this work we do not attempt to prove that our protocol is unconditionally secure against any strategy. What will be shown here is that our protocol is at least not covered by the cheating strategy used in the MLC no-go theorem that makes all previous QBC schemes insecure.
Briefly, the MLC no-go theorem and all its variations [5] [6] [7] [8] , [31] - [52] have the following common features.
(i) The reduced model. According to the no-go proofs, any QBC protocol can be reduced to the following model. Alice and Bob together own a quantum state in a given Hilbert space. Each of them performs unitary transformations on the state in turns. All measurements are performed at the very end.
(ii) The coding method. The quantum state corresponding to the committed bit b has the form
Here the systems A and B are owned by Alice and Bob
} is an orthogonal basis of system
's are not necessarily orthogonal to each other.
(iii) The concealing condition. To ensure that Bob's information on the committed bit is trivial before the unveil phase, any QBC protocol secure against Bob should satisfy
where ρ B b ≡ T r A |ψ b ψ b | is the reduced density matrix of the state sent to Bob corresponding to Alice's committed bit b. Note that in some presentation of the no-go proofs (e.g. [38, 40, 43, 50] ), this feature was expressed using the trace distance or the fidelity instead of the reduced density matrices, while the meaning remains the same.
(iv) The cheating strategy. As long as Eq. (3) is satisfied, there exists a local unitary transformation for Alice to map |ψ 0 into |ψ 1 successfully with a high probability [100] . Thus a dishonest Alice can unveil the state as either |ψ 0 or |ψ 1 at her will with a high probability to escape Bob's detection. For this reason, a concealing QBC protocol cannot be binding.
The key that makes our protocol evade the no-go proofs is that it does not have the feature (iii). As shown in Eq. (1), every bit value c i in our protocol are encoded with orthogonal states. Therefore the state |Ψ c ≡ |Ψ c1 ⊗ |Ψ c2 ⊗ ... ⊗ |Ψ cn corresponding to a codeword c is orthogonal to any other state
corresponding to a different codeword c ′ . Consequently, the two Hilbert spaces supported by the states corresponding to the codeword subsets C (0) and C (1) respectively are completely orthogonal to each other. Therefore it is obvious that our protocol satisfies ρ
instead of Eq. (3). Then Alice's cheating strategy (iv) will no longer apply because the corresponding unitary transformation does not exist without Eq. (3). Since all existing no-go proofs of unconditionally secure QBC [5] [6] [7] [8] , [31] - [52] have the feature ρ B 0 ≃ ρ B 1 , we can see that they all fail to cover our protocol.
Let us elaborate in more details. The existence of Alice's cheating strategy in the no-go proofs is backed by the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) theorem [100] basing on Schmidt decomposition. Following the manner of [31] , it can be expressed in simple words as:
The HJW theorem: Let 
or
respectively, where the meaning of the notations are the same as that of Eq. (2). When the concealing condition ρ 
Comparing with Eq. (5), we can see that |ψ b=0 differs from |ψ b=1 only by a local unitary transformation U A of Alice which maps { e
That is, with this transformation, Alice can alter the commitment in the unveil phase by herself. The actual cheating procedure is as follows. Alice always uses |ψ b=0 to execute the commit protocol regardless the value of b. Later, if she wants to unveil b = 0, she simply measures system A in the basis { e .
(1) j A
. Thus she can always unveil b = 0 successfully with the probability 100%, while unveiling b = 1 can also be successful with a very high probability (which can reach 100% when ρ B 0 equals to ρ B 1 exactly). Namely, Alice can cheat because there are two different bases for system A, both of which can lead to a legitimate outcome in the unveil phase. n together form a single set of orthogonal quantum states with associated probability described by a density matrix ρ. When constructing a composite system A ⊗ B such that B alone has density matrix ρ, the "two" measurements M , M ′ (with the property that applying M (resp. M ′ ) to A yields an index j of state f (0) j (resp. f
But in our QBC
(1) j ) to which B will have collapsed) now both become incomplete mea-surements on system A. }, it will not lead to any specific legitimate unveiled outcome with certainty, because it will collapse the state of each qubit she sent to Bob into |Ψ = cos θ |a + sin θ |b (where θ = kπ ± π/4, k is an integer) or similar forms, instead of Eq. (1). Thus it will only increase the probability for her cheating to be detected. Therefore we see that the feature ρ
eliminates the existence of a second legitimate measurement basis, making Alice's cheating strategy described in the previous paragraph futile in our protocol.
In fact, similar characters can also be found in a bit commitment protocol proposed by Kent [53] , which bases its security on relativity instead of quantum mechanics. As pointed out in the 3rd paragraph of the introduction of [47] , "Kent's relativistic bit commitment protocol does not rely on the existence of alternative decompositions of a density operator, and so its security is not challenged by the Mayers-Lo-Chau result." As our protocol uses orthogonal states to encode the committed bit, it does not rely on alternative decompositions either. Thus it can evade the MLC theorem for the same reason.
On the other hand, our protocol is still concealing against Bob despite that ρ are distinguishable theoretically as the states are orthogonal, Bob is unable to perform the corresponding measurement before the unveil phase while escaping Alice's detection. This is because the protocol puts a limit on the number of qubits that he is allowed to measure, as he is required to apply the intercept mode with probability α < 1 − d/n only. So the key question is whether a dishonest Bob can make his intercept mode indistinguishable with the bypass mode to Alice with a probability higher than it was evaluated in step (5) of our protocol. This is prevented by two important features of the QKD scheme [94] on which our QBC protocol is based. First, the use of the storage rings makes the two wave packets of each single qubit of Alice never presented simultaneously in the quantum channels. This prevents Bob from knowing the arrival of Alice's qubit in time by measuring channel A alone, as it will disturb the state of the qubit and make the intercept mode lose its advantage of distinguishing Alice's state. Secondly, Alice's sending time is random and kept secret until step (7) . Therefore in step (5) Bob has to decide himself whether to send |Ψ 0 into the quantum channels to Alice, before he can be sure whether he will detect a qubit in the quantum channels from Alice. He cannot avoid the case where he sent |Ψ 0 to Alice, while finds out later that Alice has not sent him a qubit at the corresponding time instant. Then his interception will be revealed once Alice detects |Ψ 0 , just as expected in the protocol. Thus a dishonest Bob intercepting more qubits than allowed will inevitably introduce a very high estimated value of α in step (6) , so that the cheating will be revealed.
More generally, if there exists a strategy enabling Bob to intercept most of Alice's qubit without being detected, then in the QKD scheme [94] , an eavesdropper will be able to apply the same strategy to gain a non-trivial amount of information of the secret key while escaping the detection too. But there were already many studies on the scheme in [94] proving that it is indeed unconditionally secure [94, 95, [101] [102] [103] . Therefore all these proofs can be regarded as further supports on the security of our protocol.
In short, the use of orthogonal states make our protocol evade Alice's cheating strategy suggested by the no-go proofs, while the security against Bob is provided by the security of the QKD scheme on which our QBC protocol is based.
V. LIMITATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
Nevertheless, our protocol has the limitation that it cannot force Alice to commit to a classical bit. Alice can skip step (3). Then in step (4), instead of choosing a particular codeword c and preparing the system B to be sent to Bob in the state |Ψ c ≡ |Ψ c1 ⊗ |Ψ c2 ⊗ ... ⊗ |Ψ cn , she introduces an ancillary system A and prepares the state of the incremented system A ⊗ B in an entangled form as
λ c |e c ⊗ |Ψ c .
(7)
Here {|e c } is a set of orthogonal states that forms a basis of system A. Alice keeps system A at her side unmeasured, and sends system B to Bob to complete the rest of the commit protocol. By the time she needs to unveil the committed b, she completes the measurement on system A and knows which |Ψ c system B collapsed to. With this method, she can learn what can be announced as the value of the codeword c (and therefore b) without conflicting with Bob's measurement. As a consequence, her commitment was kept at the quantum level until the unveil phase. But we must note that this problem, according to Sec. III of [99] , "is not considered a security failure of a quantum BC protocol per se". This is because, as we shown above, our protocol has the feature ρ B 0 ⊥ ρ B 1 , i.e., all |Ψ c 's corresponding to the codewords c ∈ C (0) are orthogonal to these corresponding to c ∈ C (1) . Thus the probability for the state Eq. (7) to be unveiled as b = 0 successfully is
while the probability for it to be unveiled as b = 1 is
The normalization condition for Eq. (7) gives
Therefore, despite that our protocol cannot force Alice to commit to a particular classical value of b, she is forced to commit to a probability distribution (p 0 , p 1 ) once she prepared the state of A⊗B in step (4). She can no longer change the value of either p 0 or p 1 later. The final value of the unveiled b is completely out of her control. Instead, it is determined by the quantum uncertainty in her final measurement on the system A. As stated clearly in [99] , when Eq. (10) is satisfied, the protocol already meets the requirement of what is defined as unconditionally secure QBC. Note that the relativistic bit commitment protocol [53] is well-accepted as being unconditionally secure, even though it has exactly the same problem. Most previous QBC protocols are considered insecure because the corresponding p 0 + p 1 is larger and cannot be made arbitrarily close to 1. In fact in some of these protocols (e.g., [3, 4] ), p 0 + p 1 even reaches or is arbitrarily close to 2. On the other hand, if a protocol can force Alice to commit to a particular classical b, i.e., besides p 0 + p 1 = 1, both p 0 and p 1 can only take the values 0 or 1 instead of any value in between, then it is called a bit commitment with a certificate of classicality (BCCC) [99] . Namely, our protocol is a QBC but not a BCCC.
The difference between QBC and BCCC makes it important to re-examine the relationship between BC and other cryptographic tasks at the quantum level. For example, though BC and oblivious transfer (OT) [2, 104] are equivalent at the classical level, our QBC protocol may not lead to unconditionally secure quantum OT (QOT) [1, 105] , at least, not in the traditional way described in these references. Note that there are many variations of OT [2], e.g., 1-out-of-2 OT [105, 106] . Here we use the original one [1, 104] (also called all-or-nothing OT) as an example. It is defined as the following process.
Alice wants to transfer a secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} to Bob. At the end of the protocol, either Bob could learn the value of b with the reliability (which means the probability for Bob's output b to be equal to Alice's input) 100%, or he has zero knowledge on b. Each case should occur with the probability 1/2, and which one finally happens is out of their control. Meanwhile, Alice should learn nothing about which case takes place. According to Sec. 2 of [1], QOT can be built upon BC as follows.
The QOT protocol: (I) Let |0, 0 and |0, 1 be two orthogonal states of a qubit, and define |1, 0 ≡ (|0, 0 + |0, 1 )/ √ 2, |1, 1 ≡ (|0, 0 −|0, 1 )/ √ 2. That is, the state of a qubit is denoted as |a i , g i , where a i represents the basis and g i distinguishes the two states in the same basis. For i = 1, ..., n, Alice randomly picks a i , g i ∈ {0, 1} and sends Bob a qubit φ i in the state |a i , g i .
(II) For i = 1, ..., n, Bob randomly picks a basis b i ∈ {0, 1} to measure φ i and records the result as |b i , h i . Then he commits (b i , h i ) to Alice using the BC protocol.
(III) Alice randomly picks a subset R ⊆ {1, ..., n} and tests Bob's commitment at positions in R. If any i ∈ R reveals a i = b i and g i = h i , then Alice stops the protocol; otherwise, the test result is accepted.
(IV) Alice announces the bases a i (i = 1, ..., n). Let T 0 be the set of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with a i = b i , and If QBC instead of BCCC is used as the BC protocol in step (II), Bob can make use of its limitation to enable a so-called honest-but-curious attack [107] [108] [109] [110] , as shown below. For each φ i (i = 1, ..., n), Bob does not pick a classical b i and measure it in step (II). Instead, he introduces two ancillary qubit systems B i and H i as the storages for the bits b i and h i , and prepares their initial states as |B i = (|0 B + |1 B )/ √ 2 and |H i = |0 H respectively. Here |0 and |1 are orthogonal. Then he applies the unitary transformation = 1) , and stores the result h i in system H i . It is different from a classical program with the same function as no destructive measurement is really performed, since U 1 is not a projective operator. Consequently, the bits b i and h i are kept at the quantum level instead of being collapsed to classical values.
Bob then commits (b i , h i ) to Alice at the quantum level. This can always be done in a QBC protocol which does not satisfy the definition of BCCC. For example, to commit b i in our QBC protocol, Bob further introduces two ancillary systems E and Ψ and prepares the initial state as
where N is the normalization constant. Let U E⊗Ψ be a unitary transformation on E ⊗ Ψ which can map each
|e c ⊗ |Ψ c . Bob applies the unitary transformation
on the incremented system B i ⊗E ⊗Ψ, where I E⊗Ψ is the identity operator of system E ⊗ Ψ. As a result, we can see that the final state of B i ⊗φ i ⊗H i ⊗E ⊗Ψ will be very similar to Eq. (7) if we view B i ⊗φ i ⊗H i ⊗E as system A. Then Bob can follow the process after Eq. (7) (note that now Bob becomes the sender of the commitment while Alice becomes the receiver) to complete the commitment of b i without collapsing it to a classical value. He can do the same to h i . Back to step (III) of the QOT protocol. Whenever (b i , h i ) (i ∈ R) are picked to test the commitment, Bob simply unveils them honestly. Since these (b i , h i ) will no longer be useful in the remaining steps of the protocol, it does not hurt Bob's cheating. Note that the rest (b i , h i ) (i / ∈ R) are still kept at the quantum level. After Alice announced all bases a i (i = 1, ..., n) in step (IV), Bob introduces a single global control qubit S ′ for all i, initialized in the state |s
, and yet another ancillary system Γ i for each i ∈ T 0 ∪ T 1 − R initialized in the state |Γ i = |0 Γ . Then he applies the unitary transformation
on the incremented system S ′ ⊗ B i ⊗ Γ i . Here I Γ and σ 
as the set of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with |Γ i = |0 Γ (|Γ i = |1 Γ ) instead of how they are defined in step (IV), and finishes the rest parts of the QOT protocol. With this method, the division of I 0 , I 1 are kept at the quantum level. Let I = (I = ) denote the set corresponding to a i = b i (a i = b i ). We can see that U 3 makes I 0 = I = , I 1 = I = when s ′ = 0, while I 0 = I = , I 1 = I = when s ′ = 1. Since S ′ was initialized as |s ′ = (|0 S ′ + |1 S ′ )/ √ 2, the actual result of step (IV) can be described by
where E ′ i stands for all the ancillary systems Bob introduced in the process of committing (b i , h i ). Suppose that Bob announces {I 0 , I 1 } in their original order to Alice. i.e., he never announces them in the order {I 1 , I 0 }. After Alice announced s and β s in step (V), the systems under Bob's possession can be viewed as
It means that if Bob measures system S ′ in the basis {|0 S ′ , |1 S ′ } and the result |s ′ S ′ satisfies s ′ = s, then he is able to measure the rest systems and decode the secret bit b unambiguously; else, if the result satisfies s ′ = s, then he knows that he fails to decode b. Now the most tricky part is, as the value of s ′ was kept at the quantum level before system S ′ is measured, that at this stage a dishonest Bob can choose not to measure S [107] , Bob can distinguish them using the positive operator-valued measure (POVM) (E 0 , I − E 0 ), where
This allows Bob's decoded b to match Alice's actual input with reliability (1 + √ 3/2)/2. On the contrary, when Bob executes the QOT protocol honestly, in 1/2 of the cases he can decode b with reliability 100%; in the rest 1/2 cases where he fails to decode b, he can guess the value randomly, which results in a reliability of 50%. Thus the average reliability in the honest case is 100%/2 + 50%/2 = 75% < (1 + √ 3/2)/2. Note that in the above dishonest strategy, in any case Bob can never decode b with reliability 100%. Therefore it is debatable whether it can be considered as a successful cheating, as the strategy does not even accomplish what an honest Bob can do. That is why it is called honest -but-curious behavior [108, 109] . The existence of this loophole may actually come from the fact that in the literature, there is the lack of a self-consistent definition of OT specifically made for the quantum case. That is, the goal "reaching reliability 100% and 50% with equal probabilities" may conflict with "reaching a maximal average reliability 75% with probability 100%" by nature, so that it seems unrealistic to require a protocol to satisfy both goals simultaneously. Therefore it is somewhat unfair to consider it as a limitation on the power of quantum cryptography itself. Nevertheless, as this honest-but-curious behavior provides Bob with the freedom to choose between accomplishing the original goal of QOT and achieving a higher average reliability, it may leave rooms for potential problems when we want to build even more complicated cryptographic protocols upon such a QBC based QOT.
Despite of this limitation, our QBC protocol can still be used to build many other "post-cold-war era" multiparty quantum cryptographic protocols. For example, since it makes committing a single bit possible, then repeating the protocol many times immediately enables quantum bit string commitment (QBSC) [111] . Also, building quantum strong coin tossing (QCT, a.k.a. quantum coin flipping) [3] with an arbitrarily small bias is straight forward. Alice and Bob first execute our commit protocol. Then Bob announces a random bit x classically. Finally, Alice unveils her committed bit b, and the two parties accept y ≡ b ⊕ x as the coin tossing result. It is trivial to show that even if Alice kept b at the quantum level until the unveil phase by using the state Eq. (7), she cannot bias the final y since she cannot change the probabilities p 0 , p 1 . Note that these results suggest that all the existing no-go proofs of QBSC (e.g., [112, 113] ) and QCT (e.g., [33, [114] [115] [116] [117] ) are incorrect. This is not surprising, because all these no-go proofs are also based on some conditions similar to ρ B 0 ≃ ρ B 1 , or even built directly on top of the no-go theorem of QBC, which are all inapplicable to our case.
VI. FEASIBILITY
Our protocol is very feasible. The QKD scheme [94] we based on was already experimentally implemented recently [102] . By comparing Figs. 1 and 2 it can clearly be seen that our QBC protocol can be implemented with exactly the same devices in [102] . Thus the QBSC and QCT protocols built upon our QBC protocol are also straight forward with currently available technology. Moreover, as mentioned in Sec. 3, the protocol can easily be made fault-tolerant against noisy quantum channels. Therefore it is extremely practical.
Comparing with the unconditionally secure BC protocols based on relativity [53, 54, 56, 57] , our protocol reaches the same security level, while the implementation is more convenient. This is because in all these relativistic BC, both Alice and Bob must have agents to help them carrying out the protocols. Therefore, it is in fact no longer a two-party cryptography, as what BC should have been. Also, Alice and Bob must be separated from their agents by a distance on the relativistic scale, i.e., they need to be so far apart that they cannot exchange information in time. All these requirements obviously limit the application of their protocols.
In [103] a variation of the QKD scheme in [94] was proposed, which replaced the symmetric (equal transmissivity and reflectivity) beam splitters BS 1 and BS 2 in our  FIG. 1 with asymmetric ones. The advantage is that the sending time of the qubits no longer needs to be random. The same idea may also apply to our protocol to bring the same advantage.
However, it is important to note that the beam splitters can be half-silvered mirrors or similar types, but must not be polarizing beam splitters. This is because the QKD scheme [94] we based on will become insecure if polarizing beam splitters are used. Let |H (|V ) denote the horizontally (vertically) polarized state that will always be transmitted (reflected) by polarizing beam splitters. Eve can simply use the same device of Charlie to measure all states come from Alice. Then, depending on which one of her detectors clicks, she can send |H (|V ) to Charlie through channel B (in FIG. 1 ) only, let alone channel A. This can make Charlie's detector D 1 (D 0 ) click with certainty, so that Charlie always receives the same result as hers and therefore her cheating can be covered. But if half-silvered mirrors or similar types of beam splitters are used, when Eve sends a state to Charlie through channel B alone, both of Charlie's detector D 1 and D 0 will have non-vanishing probabilities to click so that Eve cannot control the result with certainty. Then the eavesdropping will not be successful, just as shown in the security proof in [94] .
VII. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CBH THEOREM
The above result is also useful for developing the understanding on fundamental theories. The CBH theorem [96] is an attractive attempt to raise some informationtheoretic constraints to the level of fundamental laws of Nature, from which quantum theory can be deduced. These constraints were suggested to be three "no-go's", which are (I) the impossibility of superluminal information transfer, (II) the impossibility of perfectly broadcasting of an unknown state, and (III) the impossibility of unconditionally secure BC. It was worked out in [96] that these three constraints can jointly entail three definitive physical characteristics of quantum theory, i.e., kinematic independence (a.k.a. microcausality), noncommutative, and nonlocality. Meanwhile, to show that these three characteristics and the above three information-theoretic constraints are exactly equivalent, it is necessary to prove conversely that the three characteristics can entail the three constraints. This was only partly accomplished in [96] . It was demonstrated that the first two characteristics can entail constraints (I) and (II). What was left undone is the derivation of constraint (III). Note that some people believe that the problem was solved later by [47] . But in fact the no-go proof of QBC in [47] was also based on the condition ρ B 0 ≃ ρ B 1 , which fails to cover our protocol. Thus the derivation of constraint (III) is still incomplete. In our understanding, this situation is yet another evidence indicating that the MLC no-go theorem of unconditionally secure QBC is not a necessary deduction of quantum mechanics. In fact, the reason why the MLC theorem was included in the three constraints, simply put, is because it can entail nonlocality. As can be seen from features (ii) and (iv) in our above brief review of the MLC theorem, Alice can cheat in QBC only when she has the capability to manipulate entangled states. That is, the MLC theorem can be valid only if the physical world allows entanglement, which is a typical example of nonlocality. However, our QBC protocol also entail nonlocality. According to [101] , Eq. (1) can be rewritten using the standard notations of quantum optics as
where the first and second kets refer to the two quantum communication channels, and the 0 and 1 inside the kets refer to the photon number. This indicates that Alice's transmitted states in fact contain single-photon nonlocality. The resultant QBC can be executed only when Alice has the capability to create such nonlocality. Otherwise, if Alice merely sends both wave packets of a photon simultaneously into the quantum communication channels, i.e., nonlocality is not fully utilized, then Bob can easily intercept, clone, and resend all these orthogonal states without being detected. That is, our result indicates that QBC can be unconditionally secure only if there is nonlocality in the physical world. This somewhat clarifies why most previous proposed QBC protocols (e.g., [3, 4] ) are insecure. In these protocols, if Alice wants to commit honestly, then sending Bob pure states unentangled with any system at Alice's side is already sufficient. Nonlocality is not entailed when these protocols are supposed to be executed honestly. Thus, it is not surprising that a dishonest party who is capable of manipulating entangled states can gain more advantages than what is allowed in these protocols. On the contrary, in our protocol an Alice who only sends unentangled pure states will no longer be considered as honest. Nonlocality becomes a must. Thus, we can see that no matter the MLC theorem is correct or our QBC protocol could indeed be unconditionally secure, nonlocality is entailed in both cases. Therefore, we tends to believe that the (im)possibility of unconditionally secure QBC is irrelevant to the goal of characterizing quantum theory in terms of information-theoretic constraints. To complete the CBH theorem, we may need to seek for another information-theoretic principle as the third constraint.
VIII. SUMMARY
We show that if a formerly proposed QKD scheme based on orthogonal states [94] is secure, it can be used to build a QBC protocol which remains concealing while the reduced density matrix ρ only. The resultant QBC protocol is not a bit commitment with a certificate of classicality; thus, it cannot lead to unconditionally secure quantum oblivious transfer in the traditional way. But it can lead to quantum bit string commitment and quantum strong coin tossing. This finding suggests that a different principle other than the MLC no-go theorem is needed for the CBH theorem to completely characterize quantum theory in terms of information-theoretic constraints.
The Recently a cheating strategy against counterfactual QKD protocols [118, 119] was proposed [120] . Unlike general intercept-resend attacks in which measurements are performed on the quantum states carrying the secret information, in this strategy the cheater makes use of quantum counterfactual effect to detect the working modes of the devices of other participants. Thus it was named "the counterfactual attack" [120] . Here we will skip how it applies to QKD protocols, while focus only on its impact on our QBC protocol. FIG. 3 illustrates the apparatus for the attack [120] . The core is a "fictitious" beam splitter (FBS) which has the following functions.
(f1) Any photon hitting the FBS from path c will be reflected with certainty.
(f2) When the paths a and b are adjusted correctly, two wave packets coming from paths a and b respectively will interfere and combine together, and enter path c with certainty.
(f3) Any photon hitting the FBS from path a will pass through the FBS and enter path d with certainty.
An ideal FBS that can realize these functions faithfully does not exist in principle. Thus it is called "fictitious". For example, devices with the functions (f2) and (f3) may not accomplish the function (f1) perfectly, i.e., a photon coming from path c could pass the devices with a nontrivial probability, making the attack detectable. However, FBS can be implemented approximately by using an infinite number of ordinary BS [119, 120] . In practice, the number of BS involved in the implementation has to be finite. But if the deviation from an ideal FBS is too small to be detected within the capability of available technology, then the attack could become a real threat. Suppose that an ideal FBS is available to a dishonest Alice in our QBC protocol. At each time instant t j (or t j + τ ) in step (4), she runs both the FBS system in  FIG. 3 and the apparatus in the honest protocol (i.e., the one shown in FIG. 2 ) simultaneously in parallel, with path b of the FBS system connecting to both the input and output of Bob's channel A (or both the input and output of Bob's channel B). The apparatus in FIG. 2 works as usual so that the protocol can be executed as if she is honest, while the FBS system serves as a probe to detect Bob's mode. According to the function (f2) of the FBS, whenever Bob applies the bypass mode in step (5), the wave packets of a photon Alice sent to the FBS will be returned from both paths a and b so that the detector D c will click with certainty. On the other hand, whenever Bob applies the intercept mode, an ideal FBS can guarantee that D c will never click as path b is actually blocked. Therefore Alice can learn Bob's mode unambiguously. Since Bob does not know the state |Ψ ci Alice sends when he applies the bypass mode, Alice can lie about the value of the corresponding c i freely, thus alters her committed b in the unveil phase.
Nevertheless, it is easy to defeat this counterfactual attack. As pointed out in Ref. [120] , Bob's randomizing the optical length of path b is sufficient to destroy the interference effect in the FBS system. Therefore in our protocol, Bob can simply add phase shifters (other than the one shown in FIG. 2) to both channels A and B when he applies the bypass mode, to introduce the same phase shift in both channels so that an honest Alice will not be affected. Meanwhile, the amount of this phase shift is randomly chosen and kept secret from Alice, thus she cannot know how to adjust path a to ensure D c clicking with certainty. Consequently, there will be times that Alice does not know which mode Bob is running. Then the number of c i 's that she can alter will be limited, which is insufficient to change the committed b as long as the value of d/n in our QBC protocol is properly chosen.
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